
Ti i elfa personality, tnai 
i .. .. is, his opinions, his at- 
political situations, 
ami. above all, the motives which 
have actuated him to take any particular 
position on given questions, are difficult 
to Interpret, is manifest from tl 
diversity of opinion which is called forth 
when any attempt is made to explain 

One has only to listen to the divergent 
views expressed among any group of 
thinking people, or to read the various 
opinions expressed in current editorials to 
see how far apart are the views com- 
cld, and how difficult it is to 
construe his actions aWTWeW: 
tentions. Nothing has shown this more 
conspicuously than the mystification of 
the public regarding Roosevelt's course 
since his return from Africa, and his 
recent and present attitude toward his 
candidature for the Presidential nomina- 
tion. 

Various psychological analyses of Ins 
character have appeared in the newspa- 
pers, but all have been of a superficial 
sort, and have left the explanation of his 
personality as unsatisfactory as it was 
before. And yet. if he be studied in 
the light of what is now known as the 
"new psychology" everything. 1 think, 
becomes simplified, and the motives ac- 
tuating every Important mental behavior 
which he has exhibited become revealed 
In clear light. Indeed Roosevelt might 





introduced i 


nto a text- 


book of the new 


psychology 




its principles as 1 


ts principles 




plain Roosevelt. 






It is not - a 


i a short art 





■ar 



,se of teclu 
telltgii 



terms to mane tni 

to the layinan, but I shouli 

the trial. 

The first principle that 
grasped is that when we P"t something, 
Jthat we do not wish to think about 
of our minds, the real thing that. \ 
is to put it Into our minds; that is, 
comes subconscious. 



to be 



oul 



• This is not a figure of speech. A 
thought that in this way becoi 
conscious is a definite thing, and just 
as much a part of our personality, as if 
tt were in our consciousness. It can £ 
subconsciously function without our be- 
ing aware of the fact and thus uncon- 
sciously determine what our conscious 
thoughts shall be. 

This is the explanation of the well- 
known fact that, as often happens with 
many of us, we find the answer to some 
problem, upon which we were recently 
unsuccessfully engaged, suddenly to our 
astonishment pop into consciousness. Not 
having been able to find' the solution we 
gave up the problem for the time being 
and put It out of mind. What really 
happened was that we put the problem 
into the subconscious where it was carried 
on; the subconsciousness finally gave the 
answer to consciousness. 

The next principle is that we are con- 
stantly putting into the subconscious- 
ness wishes which, being shocking to our 
moral natures, we are unwilling to enter- 
tain, to admit to ourselves. We repress 
them, put them out of our minds, that is, 
Into the subconsciousness, where they per- 
sist and express themselves in certain 
ways— for instance, in dreams. 

Finally, when an unacceptable wish is 
accompanied by strong feeling and is 
repressed into the subconscious, the driv- 
ing force of the feeling tends to bring 
the thought to the surface, gl 
pression, and to accomplish its end. But 
It finds difficulty In doing this owing 
to the fact that it meets with resistance 
from the repressing force of our con- 
sciousness which will not tolerate it 
There results a conflict and the subcon- 
scious wish can only come to expressior 
in some disguised or veiled form - so veilec 
that we shall not conscioui>y wognize it 
In other words, there Is a sort of com 
promise, and the subconscious wish is al-N 
lowed expression only on condition 
we shall not be consciously aware i 
true, meaning. This is whal 
meant when in popular language we say; 






3 



if 







V^yE 




But there was another factor which was 
11 greater importance in building up 
a subconscious motive force. Roosevelt 
leaves the White House liking his " Job." 
Everybody even at this late day remem- 
bers this. " I like my job," he declaimed 
with some feeling again and again. There 
was no pretense of being tired of care 
and responsibility; no pretense of a de- 
sire to return to private life. He let the 
public Know that he liked the job of be- 
ing President. And so he went away 
with a lurking liking to be President 
again. .In nearly every country of Eu- 
rope he' was the recipient of (not sur- 
feited with) attention as a private citi- 
zen, such as is ordinarily only bestowed 
upon the heads of Government. All this 
served to remind him of the job he liked 
and had lost, and what might be if he 
were President again. 

This attitude of mind could mean only 
one thing— a wish that was intolerable, 
one that, as a matter of honor, could not 
be entertained, so he put it out of his 
mind and It went into the subconscious. 

There were two reasons why such a 
wish could not be morally acceptable to 
him as an honorable man. First, he had 
given a solemn promise to the pepole that i 
under " no circumstances " would he ac- i 
cept another term, and, second, it would 




pour oil upon the troubled waters. 
these reasons alone, therefore, the 
Impulse of any right-minded man would* 
be to go at once to his friend and sue- " 
cessor. advise, confer with him if de- \ 
sired, help him in guiding the party. 

Now what does he do? To the amaze-- 
menl of the country he studiously keeps \ 
away, and, with the exception of three . 
rather forced interviews, has kept away 
from the President ever since. 

"What was the motive force which sue- ' 

cesfully resisted a natural impulse com- '.; 

iron, to every man'/ Undoubtedly Roose- : 

I velt can give one or more plausible rea- - 

ins satisfactory to himself and convinc- •• 

g to the layman for his behavior; the,, 

verage admirer of Roosevelt can un- 

jubtedly give reasons equally satisfac- \ 

tory to himself; but it is exceedingly/' 

doubtful if Roosevelt himself knew the' 

reason. Such is the teaching of mod- . 

psychology. We must examine the '• 

ation to appreciate the full force of; 

the mental conflict going on In himself 



:ioii 



>■:,[■ 



birt; 



i, educ; 
. have 
cal poii 



tin 



llde 




speed. The people, now almost on the 
tiptoe of excitement, were l0'4"r'£°* 
another dramatic meeting of these two 
frifiids. 

Naturallv, the country expected that 
the first thing Roosevelt would do would 
be to seek the President, and it was nat- 
ural under the circumstances that he 
should do it. There were other reasons 
why he should go to him. The President, 
his friend, was in trouble. An immease 
amount of criticism had been directed at 
him by the Insurgents, progressives, tar- 
iff reformers, and malcontents. Pinchot 
had just been dismissed from office and 
was stirring up trouble. Mr. Taft was 
e a divided party and to 



la be President again. It is common knowl- 
edge that while in Africa and Europe 
received hundreds of letters from his 1 
surgent friends inciting him to insurg- 
ency and .belittling the President— his 

Pinchot, also his friend, dismissed from 
office, upable to await his return, rushes 
Italy to meet him and to pour into his 
ear heaven knows what temptations. The 
:i, weak at first, a passing thought, 
springs to life again and regains new and 
intense motive force. Still It is intolerable 
to his nature and is repressed again and 
again, and driven into the subconscious. 
Mr. Roosevelt returns to this country, 
and is straightway on arrival met by In- 
surgent friends, to whom he listens and 
with whom he soon confers. He hears a 
great deal about the " wrongs of the 



!l 



?,,.;■: 




Is Received by th* 



" Returns and 

Adulations of the People. 



®m 





people," the "betrayal or my policies, 
the control of "bad men," and so on. 
The subconscious wish which has ac- 
quired intense feeling tone under the 
excitation of all that Is poured into his 
ear (how lie could right everything If he 
were President!) now finds its oppor- 
tunity. 

There is a sub-conscious conflict be- 
tween the repressing moral conscience 
and the wish. The former is the strong- 
er: so the latter still cannot pass the 
moral censor and be consciously accept- 
ed and avowed; it can only pass 
into consciousness and determine his con- 
duct in a disguised form. This it does; 
it makes him believe, without knowing 
his real reason for his belief, that tr 
grievances of the insurgents 
grievances of the people; that his friend 
" Bill " was. after all. a mistake, and 
determines him to keep away from th 
President. Why? If he goes to th 
President he is lost! If once more h 
puts Ms arms around Mr. Taft, if he 
odvises him. becomes more or 

lis actions, he cannot as 

r oppose him and 

•s. and he cannot be again 

1012 roi 

ot be fulfilled, and h 

o 




vantage of the situation, con 
ni , specious reasons which 

leni 



i, W ith all the vi 

what appear to himself and to ot!.ers who 
wish to think as he does, high moral rea- 
sons which he thinks guided him. To 
this I answer, he is mistaken; he, like 
all others, but above all others, does no 
know himself; he has never yet faced 
himself, and any one who would know 
himself must face himself. 
" A halo round your head you 11 prate ol 
rfrtue 



round about 



- <- '- 



But shrink to face yourself as strong 

men do; 
You'll cut a swath of sorro 

you 
And think, 'To blame are they alone, 

not you." 
It ia not, I think, without interest t 
state, as showing that this analysis is 
not based upon our present knowledge 
of subsequent events, that at an early 
period, shortly after his return from Eu- 
rope when Mr. Roosevelt kept at a dis- 
tance from Mr. Taft, and before anything 





efore, In his conscious thought^ Vt 
Lily did not want to be a candl-j ,5. 



had transpired that showed his present 
intentions, the writer made the diagnosis, 
on psychological grounds alone, that the 
real factor that determined his behavior 
was the sub-conscious wish, as above 
outlined, and predicted that eventually 
he would be a candidate. Witnesses have 
recently reminded me of this diagnosis 
and prophecy. 

In this connection there is another in- 
cident that is of psychological import- 
ance, though its psychological meaning 
has entirely escaped notice of lay critics. 

It is a psychological principle that when 
a person shows very intense feeling in 
regard to some object, person, or idea, 
out of all proportion to the relative im- 
portance of that idea, it is not due, as 
would superficially appear to be the case, 
to the idea in consciousness, but to some 
other idea associated with it, but re- 
pressed rnto the subconscious. 

For instance, a person might show an 
intense dislike for such a simple thing 



logical exci 

Lssociated 

of da: . Tl 



na of these repressed memories deter 
clously the pers. 
carnations. With this principle 
„ .A us return to Mr. Roosevelt 

On June 27, 1011, Mr. Roosevelt wrote 
to Mr. Van Vaikenburg, editor of The 
Philadelphia North American, deny 
with great heat the story given out by 
the Associated Press that he (Roosevelt) 
had given assurance that he would sup 
port Mr. Taft, and vehemently asserting 
•■ that the story was not a misunderstand- 
ing; was not based upon any information 
but was a deliberate invention made 
of the whole cloth, without one particle 
of basis beyond the imagination of the 
man who made it." 

Now, why so much heat— why so much 
feeling over so small a matter as a story 
that Mr. Roosevelt would support Mr. 
Taft? Mr. Roosevelt was Mr. Taffs 
friend; he had made him President. Mr. 
Reosevelt had declared over and over 
a again (and in the same breath) that he 

ould not be a candidate himself-did not 
a candidate-and urged his 



dislike 




help a 



lovement for 



ciid.icy. There should have 



""ill 



th'ei 

e really 
date) that should have caused so much, 
emotion at the mere thought of support- 
ing Mr Taft. So intense feeling, inter- 
preted in the light of the new psychology, 
can only mean that the emotion belong- 
ing to the subconscious wish had become 
converted into conscious anger and had 
worked itself off and exhausted itself in 
that disguised form. Mr. Roosevelt un- 
doubtedly thought and still thinks his 
anger was due to the public misrepre- 
sentation of his position (harmless in it- 
self if he really wished what he believed 
he washed); actually the anger was in- 
duced by a subconscious process. 

I have no doubt Mr. Roosevelt will prob- 
ably resent this interpretation and attrib 
ute it to all sorts of malignant motives 
on the writer's part. If so, it will be 
psychologically interesting because the 
greater his resentment the greater the 
probability of the truth of the analysis. 
So it is always. 

I have only spoken of the emotion dis- 
played in this incident. His conduct in 
disclaiming all intention to support Mr 
Taft shows that, as late as June 27, his 
subconsciousness was still determining 
his attitude in a direction that would 
eventually leave it possible for him to be- 
come President again. Surely if he sup- 
ported Mr. Taft he again would be lost. 
So the impulse of the wish, striving for 
fulfillment, determines him to withhold 
his sympathy and supoprt and to encour- 
age the progressive movement which 
tended to undermine the administration. 
It was not difficult, of course, for his 
subconscious wish to present many plaus- 
ible moral reasons to his consciousness. 
Recent psychological investigations have 
shown very clearly the reality and me 
onanism of this phenomenon 
Confirmation 



this analysis is found % J 
fact that recently (statement of 
eh 3) Mr. Roosevelt confesses that at 
ie date of the Van Vaikenburg letter he 
■as ready to accept the nomination if^ 
ffered to him. Of course then he would ' 



Mr. Taf 



;■;:- 1' 



red and'?> 



■>?: 



- 



C< Mi ,U{ vlU „gj ML ,-ltf ^n^-A7' 




TT 



P 



.. Let in 



of the motive force of a subconscious} 
wish involving a strong feeling and th<J 
modes by which it works Itself out te» 
fulfillment. Lack of space prevents mjj 
referring to more than two or three incM 
''Besides keeping away from Mr. Taft« 
his friend-a friendship deliciously satir-» 
ized by Mr. Dooley— it Is notorious thaA 
Mr. Roosevelt's conduct during the New? 
York campaign and since, was caleiH 
lated, whatever his conscious intention, 
to undermine Mr. Taft's Administration* 
I pass over his disparaging, contemptuous 
remarks to personal friends in private 
conversation, remarks which were after-, 
ward repeated so widely and with sucli 
uniformity o£ style that his opinion bo-. 
came public property. Not being sus-4 
ceptlble of proof I pass these over. His) 
public actions and statements alona 
tended and were sufficient, as everyone 
lias felt, to impair Mr. Taft's popularity 
and prestige. This Is generally adroittea 
as a political fact. This line of con- 
duct, similar to keeping his distance, 
was equally extraordinary and needs 
equal explanation. It was equally op- 
posed to the natural Impulses of a nor- 
mal, high-minded man in whom had been 
inculcated the traits and impulses of 
loyalty and honor. Let us not forget that 
what is extraordinary in one man is not 
extraordinary in another. I am assum- 
ing, and I have the right to assume, 
psychologically speaking, that Mr. Roose- 
velt had all these traits and, therefore, 
necessarily had their impulses. An ac- 
tion that is contrary to them according- 
ly needs explanation. What impulse op-! 
D ilI?e?s e wh2reThe m op P osTng Impulses of 
the subconscious wish got In its work. 
Unable to express itself openly, even 
while he was consciously avowing, and 
honestly believing as he supposed, his 
determination not to contest the nomina- 
tion in lfllJ, the subconscious was deter- 
mining his judgments and directing his 
conduct so that the conditions that would 
render his nomination possible would be 
brought about, and the, wish ha f"lf«]fd 
Take another factor in the mental situ 
atlon of Col. Roosevelt's mind. Twice 
while President he had solemnly prom- 
ised the American people that he would 
not take a third term. This often quoted 
promise of Nov. 8, 1904, ran as follows: 
"The wise custom which limits the 
President to two terms regards the sub< 
stance and not the form, and under no 
circumstances will I be a candidate for 
or accept another nomination." In vie^i 
of this statement his subsequent recan« 
tation and interpretation of his promise 
has much more psychological interest thar* 
has been attributed to it Let us stud 
As far back as June 27 last, 
I will later point out. Col. Roosevel 
wag unquestionably honestly urging his 



g 5 ' j -■ j ! 



=4 




friends to drop all talk of his posslb 
candidacy and to use every effort to di: 
courage such talk In their own circles, 1 ?! 
(statement of E. A. Van Valkenbura 
March 5, 1912,) and " to prevent any such ^ 
ovement," (letter of T. R. to A. P." 
Moore Aug. IS, 1911;) this was his con-t 
sclous attitude. And yet. what now will ^ 
appear paradoxical to some at this very 
:, according to Col. Roosevelt's own 
dictated statement (March 5, 1912) and hia 
letter to Frank A. Munsey (Jan. 18, 1912) 
he was ready to accept the nomination if 
offered to him; that is to say, to recant, 
reinterpret, or misread— put it in any Ian. 
guage you choose— his promise of 1904 
" To all who then asked," says Col. Roose- 
velt, " whether I would accept if nom 
nated, I answered ' Yes,' if X knew them 
sufficiently well to be sure that they 
Id understand me." How could he 
interpret such a plain statement as he 

ade to the people as meaning two co 
secutive terms? And particularly when 
nomination for a third term was refused 
o Grant after an interval of four years 
Ve have seen that the resistance to hia 
epressed subconscious wish had prevent 
ed him up to this time from openly avow 
his candidacy. Did this wish, never- 
3SS, have just sufficient opposing 
force to evade the censor, and, sneaking 
a. disguise, unconsciously determine 
nterpretation of his promise? Let us 

is a principle o£ the "new psychol- 
ogy' that many slips of memory, of the 
ongue and pen, mistakes of spelling, the 
nisreading and interpretation of words 
fcc, are not due to chance, but are de 
ermined by subconscious processes o: 
lie mind. A repressed intolerable thought 
,r wish really drags the memory of a 
lesired word, or the correct word, &c. 

i her word, or spelling 

filch was intended, and an 

.♦her in. .ulna for the true meaning o: 



ment, ("under no circumstances wi 

lidate for or accept another 
i on,") as meaning only in It 
or as The Outlook phrased it. "I 
have no more coffee this morning." 
us give such a person the benefit of 
doubt. But Col. Roosevelt entirely o 
looked, tailed to remember, or to take in 
ning of the first part of his 
■- hologically of great 
custom whicl 





A Presidential Vacation bj 

10 latter; hafeuaf*repet 



general usage having the force of law." 
Now, what has been the common practice 
inaugurated by Washington, confirmed as 
» political principle by Jefferson, and 
held to by McKinley, and followed ever 
-lie was founded? There 
can be no difference of opinion as to this. 
It is not open to interpretation We are 
dealing with an established fact No 
President has been given more than two 
terms, whether consecutive or intermit 
tent. So the " common practice " the 
"ancient and general usage" having the 
force of law has. as Col. Roosevelt said, 
limited the President to two terms 
whether consecutive or intermittent. 

Now, it is interesting to note that Col. 
Roosevelt entirely forgot or misread this 
part of his promise. Even as far back 
as last June, (statement of March o 
>lr ) in explaining his refusal to sup- 
port Mr. Taft, he overlooked this part of 
his promise, failed to see it or remem- 
ber it. Consequently he forgot or mis- 
read it. Such a misreading the Germans 
call a verlesen. How came a person 
-- extraordinary memory as 
to forget or misread sucr. 
tatement to the public 
It 1 

from what I have alread 
consciously, or consciously, desiring „ 
itlon. the memory of that promise 
is intolerable to him: such part of it 
therefore, as is incompatible with the 
wish Is repressed from consciousness and 



Col. Roosevelt 
an important 

The psychological mechanism bv which 

brought about may be understood 

" Sub- 




J-J-% SOi en .' ? r overlooked if the vn-lttCH 

^o> ( re oefore him; the sub-. 
".'-'i then holds the attention upon, I e. 
to consciousness, so much ot 
the promise as is compatible with an in- 



' ttofltiwiJexaraDls pf> this- same nr inciple 
^TOWni Col. "Re 
Mr. Munsey, alread 



terpretation favorable 
lo and behold! the 

lon^v. 



id. 



the 



ish. 



done— uncon- 



letti 
eferred to. In 
ding into a fact a 
ined by an 



lalse meaning which is dete 
unavowed wish-a wish which has _„ 
been squarely faced by the possessor. In 
this letter, written last January, referring 
to the circumstances under which his 
Promise was given in law, he speaks of 
the custom that had grown up not to 
elect a man as President for a third con- 
secutive term" Now. plainly, as no cus- 
tom so limited has ever existed, this is a 
reading Into custom something that is 
not there, namely, a policv for which he 
I s r-ady to stand. What was it that de- 
termined his mind to so read a meaning 
into the word " custom " as to falsify it? 
A psycho-analysis of his mental processes 
i\e undoubtedly revealed a strong 
desire to have the actual custom broken 
so as to permit a third intermittent term 
for himself. With this strong unavowed 
denre in his mind he would naturallv on 

:• psyi hological i i 
think it a wise policy to permit such a 
third term and the unconscious reading 
of that meaning into the language of his 
promise would follow. Examples of his 
reading of a false meaning into a fact 
every one can recognize for himself in his 
own experience of every-day life. 

I have spoken Of the apparent paradox 
in Col. Roosevelt's attitude as early as v 
last June. At this time, it will be remem- 
bered, he was discouraging his friends 
from undertaking any aggressive move- 
ment to secure his nomination, and. at 
the same time, according to his own 
statement, he had expressed himself over 
and over again to his friends that he 
would accept the nomination " If it were k- 
offered to him." These apparently con- J 
ilicting attitudes of mind are easih in- 
telligible on the principles T have 'been,, 
explaining. He was ready to " accept If V 
nominated " because, having interpreted 








f his promise of 19u4 in accoraam 
his subconscious wish, the repress- 
g "force of his conscious censor had been 
1 -gelv withdrawn, and the subconscious 
ish came to the surface and v as toler- 
5 d .>nd he now admitted to himself that 
oesired the Presidency and would take 
if offered .. 
, er certain conditions in his conscious- 
ness to his willingness, owing to the fact 
that all the moral objections were not 
vet eliminated. He had got rid, as we 
have seen, of the main difficulty— tne 
Df 1904; there remained, however, 
another difficulty— the disloyalty to Mr 
Taft This he knew would be resented 
by the public, if it were believed lhai 
he was definitely plotting and attempting 
to secure, on h 
Presidency for hi 
people 



ild be 
ight be 



j Id 



f'or 



md 



dmself. Conse< 
hat he shouid 
orking up a 
pear ' 



people 



ssential 

event his friends from 

rament that would ap- 

indicate that lie was attempting 

. „„cure the coveted prize. 

What evidence have we of thrs inter- 

■ retation? A little later on, Aug. 18. 

1911, he wrote to Mr. Moore, Publisher of 

The' Pittsburgh Leader 

ask not only you but every 

friend I have to see to it that no move 

ent whatever is made to bring me for 

ard for the nomination in 1W12. I feel 

that I have a right to ask all my friends, 

netessaiv. actively to work to preve 

y such movement. I should esteem it 

genuine calamity if such a movement 

were undertaken." 

Why such a si a, A gen 

nine calamity"? And what cal 
Here we meet with another in 
psychological principle. We constantly 
find, on analysis, thai 
of mind, ideas, &c, &r 
ating force coming fr 
associated idea, and 
: subconsc: 
' calamity ' 



feelings, attitudes 
, r.re due to the motiv- 
g from more than 
nd some cf the latter 
>'us. In the above sen- 
might refer, and prob- 
did refer, consciously or uncon : 
sciouslv, to two objects— the country 

So far as the country was con- 
cerned if such a movement were under- 
taken the " wise custom established in 
the unwritten law by Washington and 

i might be broken. We have f 
that consciously he had satisfactorily 
himself, interpreted this custom and his 
promise "under no circun 
cent another term." But modern psy- 
chological investigations have shown that 
our conscious knowledge is not our 
whole knowledge, but that our subcon- 
scious knowledge, the great sto 
of our past experiences, may be much 
wider, more accurate, more truthful, 
ws could have probed his subconscious 
jg we would undoubtedly have 
found that true memories of Tin- i UBtom, 
and of the intention of his pron 
ideas of the calamity that would befall 
the country if the custom were broken 
Tou can fool your conscious thoughts, but 
vou cannot fool vonr subconsciousness. 
Subconsciously lie still »ii">v that his con- 
interpretation of ids promise was 
but a distortion of the truth and that this 
distortion tos determined by the sub- 
s wish. Subconsciously he still 
-new that breaking the established 
on; would be a calamity. 
More consciously, however, by " a genu- 
e c.lamitv," he undoubtedly referred ' 
nity that would come 
■ ■ he should be placed 




a dishon- 



positlon before tne 
ihc censi 

ood by the sepals- tu tin. 




J^d.^+S' i - 



Plicitv bv asking him to accept 1 _ 
nation his hands were tied. His great 
asset with the people was that 
he was believed to be honest." If- this 
belief should he shattered he would be 
lost. Further, the thought of putting 
himself in a position where he would cease 
to be the idol of the people was intol- 
erable to him. And so the wish to be 
an active candidate was repressed and 
driven into the subconscious. 
This is the only explanation of the ex- 
, m "calamity" and the feeling it 

Those who wish to make use of a man 
ido not, of course, care how much they 
drag in the mud and dishonor their-in- 
strument. They, therefore, were willing 
! to bring this ' calamity " upon Col. 
Roosevelt, who had still sufficient con- 
scious recognition of his situation to hold 
back his supposed friends. 

So it appears that on Aug. 18, 1011, the 
wish now conscious, was still not strong 
! enough to 'induce him to make a fight 
for the nomination; the people 
ripe. Here, then, we see that from last 
June and on. and possibly before that 
date, the subconscious wish was begin 
1 ning to be acceptable; in fact, had come 
1 to the surface and was admitted to him 
self. A distinct development had taken 
place in his mental processes; the sub- 
conscious and the conscious were coming 
r and blending. The wish, how- 
ever, was tolerable only up to a certain 
point: it was not tolerable to the point of 
- anting for the nomination. This 
as yet was unacceptable to his censor, 
but, we shall see. was a later develb] 
and came to pass in the course of about 
six moath3. . , . , , 

At what date the subconscious v ish to 
be an active candidate became a. 
to his consciousness, and the censor could 
allow him to carry it to fulfillment, it is 
not easv to say without an ope 
to subject Col. Roosevelt to a psycholog- 
i pi analysis and probe his mind. During 
the Fall and Winter he v.- a 
munion with his ; - "'ids. The 

so-called Progressive policies were 
lng force and em itl -in in his 

mind They were fast becoming senti- 
ments. The subconscious wish in its new- 
form was unconsciously determining his 
;o encourage these policies and 
aiiv to encourage La Follette, v> no 
had announced his candidacy, to make 
the fight. And this notwithstanding that 
he had written and. as he has eonfes-cd. 
had said to " GitTord Pinchol. Jim Gar- 
field and Con re. snian .Madison, and 
Bilh Loeb, lira Secretary Meyer, and 
B, ,-etarv ytimson, all alike." that he, had 

%Jflnf&n B dr* oV'&ff any* i s 
Here we see the unacceptable wish to be 
an active candidate unconsciously deter- 
mining his conduct. He was taking part, 
though not openly, but secretly, as part 
of what wr in suDstance an intrigue 
against Mr. Taft. He was giving aid 
and comfort to the enemy. Mel 
as is common knowledge, Col. Roosevelt s 
friends, headed by the recalcitrant Pin- 
chol, were Intriguing to bring about a 
situation in which the nomination of Col 
It would be possible in place of 
La Follette. It would be easy to recite 
facts indicative of this purpose 








fused to follow Washington and Jeffer- 
n In a patriotic statement to his fellow- 
tizens and say again that a "-wise cus- 
m " forbade his "accepting" a nomi- 
ition (What a magnificent opportunlly 
Y to -odear himself in the hearts of the peo- 
pie as a patriot!'* His refusal had only 
one meaning, that which we now know 
, ,,sitiv»lv from his own statement of 
what his position was at this time, name- 
tiling to accept if_the nomi" ' 



working to make It ap- 
pear to Col. Roosevelt that there was a 
' " call from the people " for him to 
take the nomination— a call which it was 
vield to. If this could De 
it would be open to him to 
candidacy. 

December, came what was 
the public announcement of 
Ms candidacy. He announced simply that 
candidate.'' but refused 
to say anything further in explanation. 
This was an old, time-worn, stereotyped, 
hackneyed expression which has been 
made to do duty """ 



politician 
situation has desired 
nomination. In Mr. Rooseveir 
phase was still more pregi 



this 



2 



said to numerous friends in private con- 
versatlor that he would not go further 
nd put himself In such a position that 
"- «-»- '--nds that he could 



for. .] 



fron 



after 
had said it to an assen 

guests. And all this at a 
publio- at large, including 



lie 



bled group of 

time when the 

__ i large number 

of his well wishers, and probably Mr. Taft 

himself, took his words at their face value 

V' and believed that under no circumstances 

* would he accept another nomination. 

Since the above paragraph was written 
Mr. Roosevelt has given out the letter 
(above referred fo) written by him Jan. 
IK. 1911'. to I-'rank A Munsey. the pub- 
1, slier. In this letter he states at consid- 
erable length that he would not "tie 
hi* bands lv .-. statement." for the same 
reajjoss tbat Jib .was reported to bave. 
Ki.vn to his friends, and repeats that ho 
would accept if the people wished him to 
do so. He further states that he had 
again and again made the same state- 
ment " to friends, and even foes," men- 
ioning a number of names. To say that 
... was not a candidate simply meant, 
then, in his mind, that he wuld not fight 
for the nomination, but would accept it 
It were offered him. Here we see a dis- 
tinct progression in his mental processs 
since last June. He was willing to go 
beyond privately expressed statements 
and go on public record, though in veiled 
political language, as saying " Barkis is 
willrnV' The apple of public approval 
was judged to be ripennig. 

To appreciate the force of the hack- 
neyed political expression " I am not a 
candidate," it is enough to remember 
that even now Mr. Roosevelt is only on 
public record as saying that he will ac- 
cept the nomination " if it should be of- 
fere to me." But when an active organ- 
ization, with National headquarters and 
headquarters in nearly every State, is 
working hard for his nomination, it 
means that he is an active candidate, 
e phrase is a mere euphemism, 
.m example of the curious but p 
) gically intelligible contradictions to which 



— _ human mind is suoject 
in a statement issued by Mr. 
on March 6, some time after he had an- 
nounced his willingness to accept the 1 
ination if offered to him. In this state, 
ment he still says he will accept only if 
the people in open primaries declare that 
they wish him to do so. and his manager, 
Senator Dixon, on the same date calls 
1 attention again to the fact that Col. 




Roosevelt has declared that 
an active candidate for the nomination, 
but will accept it if it comes to him as 
the demand of the voters of the party." 
But in the same statement in which Mr. 
Roosevelt lays down his strict conditions 
of acceptance he makes the slip of the 
tongue, "I am in the fight," &c. (The 
paragraph is too long to quote.) But 
surely one cannot " be in a fight " If one 
does not seek a nomination, and is deter- 
nined to fight for it. A fight means being 
an active candidate. Apparently we have 
either paradox or insincerity. Psycholog- 
ically this can be easily explained with- 
out resort to conscious insincerity 
a slip of the tongue. The impulse from 
a strong subconscious wish (inadmissible 
to himself) to get the nomination at any 
hazard slips in the expression in an inap- 
propriate place. The new psychology 
thus explains how a person misstates his 
own conscious ideas (verspreehen) as well 
as misreads his own statements. Psychol- 
ogy, however, does not deny that the 
subconscious is not one's true self. 

Some time, then, after December the 
subconscious wish to fight for the nomi- 
nation and supplant Mr. Taft had become 
accentable • to his consciousness- and was 
avowed to himselt. the r 
could now tolerate it are 
been made by his friends 
the American people s:itr b 
nothing pusillanimous, nothi 
treacherous to Mr. Taft. i 
orable in breaking a solemn 
tnpatriotic in a third 
people saw him 



...•!■;. 



He had 



If the 



light, 
nit to 
epres- 




Americ 

then at least "he could 

himself the Tightness of his wish, i 

sion could cease, it could come in 

full light of consciousness, and he could 

give full freedom to its carrying itself 

fulfillment. 

There are a number of other incidents 
Mr Roosevelt's recent career which wou 
be psychologically interesting to analyze 
but space forbids. One of them 
out prominently, namely, his opposition 
to the peace treaties published 
psychological moment of the calling of 
the Peace Convention in New York. This 
public announcement could be easily ex- 
plained on the same principles whirh'bave 
been set forth above. 

There is one point that ought to be L 
touched upon, in justice to Mr. Roose- 
velt, as in this he has not done himself 
justice. In his letter to Mr. Munsev he 
states that at the very moment when he 
gave out his famous promise to the 
American people he contemplated tire 
possibility of becoming again a < and'- 
date in 1912 or 1916. In other words he 
was guilty of duplicity, of deceiving the 
people. He admits that he was aw art 
that this statement would be interpreted 
as meaning that he never again would be 
a candidate, and yet he gav< 
the mental reservation that he might pos- 
sibly be a candidate at a future date. " 
do not believe that Mr. Roosevelt has 
done justice to himself in so statin 
this late time his previous thought 
1904. It is merely another instance of miL 
reading into a previous state of mind his 
nresent state o f mind. Undoubte dly. 





£is*u as he states, the pros and cons of 
'™e 'arguments of a third term passe', 
through his mind and were const* 
hut we must believe that he. entirely re- 
acted the arguments for a third term and 
• that his final conclusion, which he ga\e 
. outlthat u "f^ t J'°/i^^Tt S a a n o C ther^°om 
nfaUoif-repVesenteo^ln^ honest intention. 
BecaUing now. however all the memories 
of the arguments pro and con. lie mis 
reads into his previous mental attitude 



1 




^yX^Tmr charitable than hi. 



* 



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C<^1S-L.'VU' •/■ 



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